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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of the correctness of the holding in the instant case, the use of
the device approved by the court appears to offer a wide avenue
for avoiding estate taxes.
Merwin M. Brandon, Jr.
INCOME TAX - GAIN FROM A STOCK FOR STOCK PLUS BOOT
TRANSACTION
Taxpayer, sole stockholder of International Dairy Supply
Company, transferred his stock in that company to Foremost
Dairies, Inc., for 82,375 shares of the common stock of Foremost
and $3,000,000.00 cash. He reported a capital gain on the trans-
action limited to the cash less certain expenses. The Commis-
sioner determined that the entire gain, $4,163,691.94, was recog-
nizable at the time of the transaction and assessed taxpayer for
the deficiency. The Tax Court held that the recognizable gain
on the transaction was to be limited to the cash received.1 On
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit,
held, reversed. An exchange in which cash plus voting stock is
received is not a reorganization.2 The entire amount of the gain
is recognizable at the time of the transaction. Commissioner v.
Turnbow, 286 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1960).
Generally, gains on sales or exchanges are recognizable to the
full amount of the gain at the time of the transaction.3 How-
ever, it was early recognized that it would be desirable to delay
recognition of gain so that business readjustments could be made
without tax consequences in cases where the stockholders in the
enterprise are retaining their interests without the receipt of
cash and the essential continuity of business is being preserved. 4
contemplation of death. While the court did not accede to this point, it should be
noted that the agreement involved in the Gore case provided for the estate to re-
ceive the same amount which the decedent would have received had he sold out
during his lifetime. That fact might well make the reasoning of the Gore case in-
applicable in situations similar to the Land case, where the agreement provides for
a change in the value of the business interest when the partner's estate, rather
than the partner, is the vendor.
1. Grover D. Turnbow, 32 T.C. 646 (1959).
2. The only reorganization definition that could be applicable would be Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(g) (1) (B), now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §368(a) (1)
(B). See note 11 infra.
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112 (a), 53 Stat. 37, now INT. REV. CODE Or
1954, § 1002.
4. Letter from Secretary of Treasury, 78 Cong. Rec. 2512 (1934). See, gen-
erally, SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-1861
(1938).
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To implement this policy, Congress has continually provided for
non-recognition of gain resulting from corporate reorganiza-
tions.5 No gain or loss is recognized by parties to a reorganiza-
tion if stock or securities in a corporation a party to the reor-
ganization are, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, ex-
changed solely for stock or securities of another corporate party
to the reorganization. 6 If there were no further qualification of
this rule, the receipt of consideration other than stock or securi-
ties would result in recognition of the entire gain on the reorgan-
ization at the time of the transaction.7 However, this provision
has been specifically modified to provide that where there would
have been a non-recognizable gain except for consideration re-
ceived other than stock or securities of a corporate party to the
reorganization, gain will be recognized but will be limited to the
amount of "other consideration" or "boot" received.8 Thus,
through the "boot" provision, the taxpayer is permitted to defer
recognition of gain on a reorganization to the extent that he re-
ceives stock and securities of a corporation a party to the re-
organization. 9
The structure of the reorganization provisions of the Internal
Revenue Codes of 1939 and 1954 indicate that a prerequisite to
the applicability of any of the provisions limiting recognition of
gain is that the transaction under consideration meet the statu-
tory definition of a reorganization."0 Six statutory definitions
of the term reorganization are supplied by the Internal Revenue
Codes, including the two which are pertinent here." The In-
5. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c).
6. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(g), 53 Stat. 40, as amended ch. 247,
53 Stat. 870 (1939), now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368.
7. The transaction would not then be for solely stock or securities of a cor-
porate party to the reorganization.
8. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(c), 53 Stat. 39, now INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 356. The provision enumerates the sections it modifies; hence it could be
assumed that the enumeration is intended to be exclusive.
9. The purpose of this entire section of the Internal Revenue Code is to
defer payment of tax on a transaction until a future date, with a view to allowing
the "specified" types of reorganizations to be accomplished without the necessity
of payment of tax on "unrealized paper profits." See note 2 supra.
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(g) (1) (B), now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,§368(a) (1) (B), defines reorganizations. Section 112(b) (3) of the 1939 Code
(now Section 354(a) (1) of the 1954 Code) provides that where solely stock or
securities are exchanged where there is a reorganization no gain or loss is to be
recognized. Section 112(c) of the 1939 Code (now Section 356(a) of the 1954
Code) provides that where a gain on a transaction would be tax free but for the
solely provision of Section 112(b) (3) of the 1939 Code (now Section 354(a) (1)
of the 1954 Code), gain will be recognized but limited to the amount of "boot"
received.
11. These definitions include (a) a statutory merger or consolidation; (b) the
acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting
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ternal Revenue Code of 1939 requires that in order to qualify
the acquiring corporation give solely voting stock as considera-
tion either for 80% of all classes of stock of another corpora-
tion 1 2 or for substantially all the properties of another corpora-
tion.18 Since both definitions require the acquiring corporation
to give solely voting stock, it would appear that the transaction
would not be a "reorganization" by statutory definition if some
consideration other than voting stock were given. If there were
a statutory provision to allow the exchange of stock to be con-
sidered as a transaction apart from the "boot" received, the
transaction could meet the statutory definition of reorganiza-
tion. However, the only provision which might be applicable,
the "boot" provision,'1 4 is limited to certain sections of the Code,
not including the reorganization definitions. 15 Since the "boot"
provision does not modify the reorganization definitions, a stock
for stock transaction which includes "boot" would seem to come
under the general rule16 making both gains and losses fully rec-
ognizable at the time of the transactions. 17
The "solely for voting stock" requirement of the reorganiza-
tion definitions under consideration was added to the law in
1934 because of concern over the use of these definitions to cast
transactions which were in substance taxable sales in the tech-
nical form of reorganizations.1 In interpreting this requirement
stock, of at least 80 per cent of the voting stock and at least 80 per cent of the
total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation; (c)
the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its vot-
ing stock, of substantially all the properties of another corporation, but in de-
termining whether the exchange is solely for voting stock the assumption by the
acquiring corporation of a liability of the other, or the fact that property acquired
is subject to a liability, shall be disregarded; (d) a transfer by a corporation of
all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer
the transferor or its shareholders or both are in control of the corporation to
which the assets are transferred; (e) a recapitalization; (f) a mere change in
identity, form, or place of organization, however effected. Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
ch. 1, § 112(g) (1), 53 Stat. 40, as amended, ch. 247, 53 Stat. 870 (1939), now
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368.
12. Section 112(g) (1) (B). See note 11 supra.
13. Section 112(g) (1) (C). See note 11 supra.
14, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(c), 53 Stat. 39, now INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 356(a).
15. See notes 8 and 10 supra.
16. See note 3 8upra.
17. Commissioner v. Turnbow, 286 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1960). See Helvering
v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942) ; contra, Howard v. Com-
missioner, 238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956).
18. See note 8 supra. The "solely for voting stock" requirement was added to
correct abuses of the existing law. The House Ways and Means Subcommittee
thought the abuses so flagrant that they proposed that the reorganization pro-
visions in Section 112 be abolished. H.R. Rep., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 4, 1933).
However, the committee decided that the wiser course would be to amend drastic-
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the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Cor-
poration19 said: "Congress has provided that the ... [exchange]
must be 'solely' for 'voting stock' of the transferee. 'Solely' leaves
no leeway. Voting stock plus some other consideration does not
meet the statutory requirement. 2 0 It must be noted, however,
that in the Southwest Consolidated case the issue involved did
not bring the "boot" provision before the consideration of the
Court.21
The problem of the applicability of the "boot" provision in
connection with the "solely for voting stock" requirement was
presented to the Seventh Circuit in Howard v. Commissioner.22
Petitioners had exchanged 80.19% of the total number of shares
of stock for "solely for voting stock" of the acquiring corpora-
tion whereas other stockholders exchanged the remaining shares
for cash. In holding that the petitioners had no recognizable
gain at the time of the transaction, the court said "but for the
cash received in exchange for the 19.81% of the ... stock..
the transaction would have met the 'solely' requirement of
[the reorganization definition] ."23 Thus, in effect, the Seventh
Circuit determined that whether a transaction meets the reor-
ganization definition is to be determined by considering the
transaction separate and apart from the boot received.24
Another possible construction of the statutory definition of
reorganization was rejected by the Court in Howard v. Commis-
sioner. It was argued there that the definition could be con-
strued to mean that an exchange where at least 80% of the stock
of a corporate party to a reorganization was acquired "solely for
voting stock" of another corporate party would be a reorganiza-
ally the provisions so as to stop the known cases of tax avoidance, rather than to
eliminate the sections completely. H.R. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933).
19. 315 U.S. 194 (1942).
20. Id. at 198.
21. The carry-over basis of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 113 (a) (7) was at issue.
Id. at 196.
22. 238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956).
23. Id. at 948.
24. It is difficult to determine how the applicable sections could be construed
to permit the "boot" provision to modify the definition of a reorganization. The
"boot" provision, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(c), provides that where the ex-
change would be within the provisions of Section 112(b) (3), but for "boot" re-
ceived, gain will be recognized but limited to the amount of the boot. Section
112(b) (3) provides no gain or loss is to be recognized where solely stock is ex-
changed for stock in pursuance of a plan of reorganization. Section 112(b) (3)
provides no definition of the term reorganization. The definition is provided in
Section 112(g) (1) (B) of which Section 112(c) makes no mention. It would ap-
pear that Section 112(c) should not modify the definition of reorganization. See
notes 8 and 10 supra.
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tion even though other stockholders were given cash or other con-
sideration for the remaining stock.2 The court, however, found
that the construction of the "solely for voting stock" in the
Southwest Consolidated case was decisive of this point in that all
the consideration received by all parties must be "solely voting
stock."2
In the instant case the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, re-
jecting the Howard rationale, held that the transaction did not
qualify as a reorganization due to the "solely for voting stock"
requirement which precluded the receipt of "boot." Since the
instant transaction was not a reorganization, the "boot" pro-
vision could not operate to limit the recognizable gain.
One factor considered in both the Howard and the instant
cases was the potential effect of the decisions on the possibility
of recognition of losses from exchanges not solely in kind.27 The
provision for limiting the recognition of losses from exchanges
not solely in kind, a companion provision of the limitation of
gain provision, states that, where there would have been no
recognizable loss on a reorganization but for "boot" received, no
loss will be recognized. 28 Obviously, if the rationale of the in-
stant case is followed, a transaction of the kind involved here
would not be subject to the limitation of loss provision since it
could not qualify as a reorganization by definition. Thus the loss
would be fully recognizable at the time of the transaction. 29 In
considering the possibilities of loss recognition, the Ninth Cir-
cuit observed that Congress seemed to have weighed the desir-
able features of the limitation of gain provisions against the un-
desirable potentialities of the recognition of losses.80 The court
25. The "solely" provision could be deemed to apply only to the 80% require-
ment. If this were true, it would seem that the owners of the 80% (or more) of
the stock should not be able to receive "other consideration" for additional stock
if the transaction were to qualify as a reorganization. However, the Southwest
Consolidated case would seem to be controlling even here, since at the time of the
Controversy (B) and (C) of Section 112(g) (1) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939
were combined, even though the Southwest Consolidated case was decided on what
would have been Section 112(g) (1) (C) of the Int. Rev. Code, which did not have
the 80% requirement. See Howard v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 943, 946 (7th Cir.
1956). See also Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(g) (1) (B), (C).
26. See note 25 supra.
27. Int. Rev, Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(e), 53 Stat. 39, now INT. REV. CODE
oF 1954, § 356.
28. Ibid.
29. Since the loss provision is limited to certain enumerated sections, as is
true with gains (see note 8 supra), a small amount of cash would take the trans-
action out of the definition of reorganization. Hence, the provision would not be
applicable to a transaction of this kind.
30. Commissioner v. Turnbow, 286 F.2d 669, 674 (9th Cir. 1960).
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then added that to permit the possibility of tax avoidance
through recognition of losses to control the construction of the
limitation of gain provision would be to overrule the apparent
judgment of Congress on this question. 1
Although the adoption of the rationale of the instant case
might well result in the conversion of what would otherwise be
legitimate reorganizations into transactions in which losses
would be currently recognizable, it would seem that the legisla-
tive history soundly supports the instant decision. If Congress
has constructed this provision in such a manner as to permit its
abuse, the correction should be made by the Congress, not by
judicial fiat.
Martin Smith, Jr.
INSURANCE- AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE- "TEMPORARY
SUBSTITUTE" PROVISION- WITHDRAWN FROM NORMAL USE
Plaintiff sought to recover damages resulting from an ac-
cident in which defendant's insured was involved. Defendant
had issued a liability policy on a family car which was registered
and insured in the wife's name. At the time of the accident the
husband was driving the son's car, because the poor condition
of the tires on the family car rendered its use on long trips
hazardous. Despite the condition of the tires on the family car,
the wife and son continued to use it to go a short distance to
and from work. The insurer contended that the family policy
issued to the wife did not provide coverage for the accident since
the family car had not been withdrawn from normal use as
required by the temporary substitute provision. The court of
appeal held for the plaintiff, finding that the family car had
been withdrawn from regular, normal use and that the son's
automobile was a temporary substitute automobile covered by
the policy issued on the family car. On appeal to the Louisiana
Supreme Court, held, reversed, two Justices dissenting. The
son's car was not a temporary substitute automobile because
the insured's automobile had not been withdrawn from normal
use as required by that provision.' Fullilove v. United States
Casualty Co., 125 So.2d 389 (La. 1960).
31. Id. at 675.
1. It appears that the opinion did not consider the question of breakdown to
any appreciable extent. Before considering the question of withdrawal from
normal use the court stated: "[T]ires being necessary to the operation of the
NOTES 83519611
